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Abstract—Motivated by applications of multi-agent learning in
noisy environments, this paper studies the robustness of gradient-
based learning dynamics with respect to disturbances. While
disturbances injected along a coordinate corresponding to any
individual player’s actions can always affect the overall learning
dynamics, a subset of players can be disturbance decoupled—i.e.,
such players’ actions are completely unaffected by the injected
disturbance. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions to
guarantee this property for games with quadratic cost functions,
which encompass quadratic one-shot continuous games, finite-
horizon linear quadratic (LQ) dynamic games, and bilinear
games. Specifically, disturbance decoupling is characterized by
both algebraic and graph-theoretic conditions on the learning
dynamics, the latter is obtained by constructing a game graph
based on gradients of players’ costs. For LQ games, we show that
disturbance decoupling imposes constraints on the controllable
and unobservable subspaces of players. For two player bilinear
games, we show that disturbance decoupling within a player’s
action coordinates imposes constraints on the payoff matrices.
Illustrative numerical examples are provided.
Index Terms—game theory, machine learning, decentralized
control.
I. INTRODUCTION
AS the application of learning in multi-agent settings gainstraction, game theory has emerged as an informative
abstraction for understanding the coupling between algorithms
employed by individual players (see, e.g., [1]–[3]). Due to
scalability, a commonly employed class of algorithms in both
games and modern machine learning approaches to multi-
agent learning is gradient-based learning, in which players
update their individual actions using the gradient of their
objective with respect to their action. In the gradient-based
learning paradigm, continuous quadratic games stand out as
a benchmark due to their simplicity and ability to exemplify
state-of-the-art multi-agent learning methods such as policy
gradient and alternating gradient-descent-ascent [4].
Despite the resurgence of interest in learning in games,
a gap exists between algorithmic performance in simulation
and physical application in part due to disturbances in mea-
surements [5]. Robustness to environmental noise has been
analyzed in a wide variety learning paradigms [6], [7]. Most
analysis focuses on independent and identically distributed
stochastic noise drawn from a stationary distribution.
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In contrast, we study adversarial disturbance without any
assumptions on its dynamics or bounds on its magnitude.
Though some work exists on the effects of bounded adversarial
disturbance in multi-agent learning [8], there is limited under-
standing of how gradient disturbance propagates through the
network structure as determined by the coupling of the play-
ers’ objectives. Does gradient-based learning fundamentally
contribute to or reduce the propagation of disturbance through
player actions? Our analysis aims to answer this question for
gradient-based multi-agent learning dynamics. The insights we
gain provide desiderata to support algorithm synthesis and
incentive design, and will lead to improved robustness of
multi-agent learning dynamics.
Contributions. The main contribution is providing a novel
graph-theoretical perspective for analyzing disturbance decou-
pling in multi-agent learning settings. For quadratic games,
we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition, which can be
verified in polynomial time, that ensures complete decoupling
between the corrupted gradient of one player and the learned
actions of another player, stated in terms of algebraic and
graph-theoretic conditions. The latter perspective leads to
greater insight on the types of cost coupling structures that
enjoy disturbance decoupling, and hence, provides a frame-
work for designing agent interactions, e.g., via incentive design
or algorithm synthesis. Applied to LQ games, a benchmark
for multi-agent policy gradient algorithms, we show that
disturbance decoupling enforces necessary constraints on the
controllable subspace in relation to the unobservable subspace
of individual players. Applied to bilinear games, we show that
disturbance decoupling enforces necessary constraints on the
players’ payoff matrices.
II. RELATED WORK
We study gradient-based learning for N–player quadratic
games with continuous cost functions and action sets. Con-
vergence guarantees for gradient-based learning are studied
from numerous perspectives including game theory [1], [3],
[9], control [10], and machine learning [2], [11].
Convergence guarantees for gradient-based learning dynam-
ics under stochastic noise are studied in [2], [3], [11]. Despite
being an important property to understand for adversarial
disturbance, how non-stochastic noise propagates through the
player network has no guarantees.
Our analysis draws on geometric control [12]–[14]. In [12],
algebraic conditions for disturbance decoupling within a single
dynamical system is given. In [14], disturbance decoupling
for a single structured dynamical system is studied with
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frequency-based techniques. In this paper, we provide both
the algebraic and graph-theoretic conditions for disturbance
decoupling of coupled dynamical systems in gradient-based
multi-agent learning.
III. CONTINUOUS GAMES AND THE GAME GRAPH MODEL
Let [N ] = {1, 2, . . . , N} denote the index set where N ∈ N.
For a function f ∈ Cr(Rn,R) with r ≥ 2, Dif = ∂f/∂xi is
the partial derivative with respect to xi.
Consider an N -player continuous game (f1, . . . , fN ) where
for each i ∈ [N ], fi ∈ Cr(Rn,R) with r ≥ 2 is player i’s cost
function and Rn = Rn1 × . . .×RnN is the joint action space,
with Rni denoting player i’s action space and n =
∑N
i=1 ni.
Each player’s goal is to select an action xi ∈ Rni to minimize
its cost fi : Rn → R given the actions of all other players.
That is, player i seeks to solve the following optimization
problem:
min
xi∈Rni
fi(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xN︸ ︷︷ ︸
:= x
). (1)
One of the most common characterizations of the outcome of
a continuous game is a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). For an N–player continuous
game (f1, . . . , fN ), a joint action x? = (x?1, . . . , x
?
N ) ∈ Rn is
a Nash equilibrium if for each i ∈ [N ],
fi(x
?) ≤ fi(x?1, . . . , x?i−1, xi, x?i+1, . . . , x?N ), ∀ xi ∈ Rni .
A. Gradient-based learning
We consider a class of simultaneous play, gradient-based
multi-agent learning techniques such that at iteration k, player
i receives hi(xk) from an oracle to update its action as follows:
xk+1i = x
k
i − γihi(xk1 , . . . , xkN ), (2)
where γi > 0 is player i’s step size,
hi(x
k) = Difi(x
k) + dki (3)
is player i’s gradient evaluated at the current joint action xk
and affected by a player-specific, arbitrary additive disturbance
dki ∈ Rni . In the setting we analyze, dki can modify xki to any
other action within Rni .
Under reasonable assumptions on step sizes—e.g., relative
to the spectral radius of the Jacobian of hi in a neighborhood
of a critical point—it is known that the undisturbed dynamics
converge [2], [3]. While such a guarantee cannot be given for
arbitrary disturbances as considered in this paper, we provide
conditions under which a subset of players still equilibriates
and follows the undisturbed dynamics.
B. Quadratic games
For an N–player continuous game (f1, . . . , fN ), behavior
of gradient-based learning around a local Nash equilibrium can
be approximated by linearizing the learning dynamics, where
the linearization corresponds to a quadratic game.
Definition 2 (Quadratic game). For each i ∈ [N ], fi : Rn →
R is defined by
fi(x) = x
>
i Pixi + x
>
i (
∑
j 6=iPijxj + ri). (4)
Quadratic games encompass potential games [15] with
Pij = P
>
ji , and zero sum games [16] with Pij = −P>ji . We
give further examples of quadratic games in Section III-D.
C. Game graph
To highlight how an individual player’s action updates
depend on others’ actions, we associate a directed graph to
the gradient-based learning dynamics defined in (2).
We consider a directed graph ([N ], E), where [N ] is the
index set for the nodes in the graph, and E is the set of edges.
Each node i ∈ [N ] is associated with action xi of the ith
player. A directed edge (j, i) points from j to i and has weight
matrix Wij ∈ Rni×nj , such that (j, i) ∈ E if Wij 6= 0 element-
wise. For each node i, we assume the self loop edge (i, i)
always exists and has weight Wii ∈ Rni×ni . The composite
matrix W ∈ Rn×n with entries Wij is the adjacency matrix
of the game graph.
On a game graph, we define a path p = (i, v1, . . . , vk−1, j)
as a sequence of nodes connected by edges. The set of paths
Pkij includes all paths starting at i and ending at j, traversing
k + 1 nodes in total. For a path p = (i, v1, . . . , vk−1, j), we
define its path weight as the product of consecutive edges on
the path, given by Wj,vk−1 . . .Wv1,i =
∏k−1
l=0 Wvl+1,vl .
In the absence of disturbances di, the update in (2) for a
quadratic game reduces to
xk+1 = Wxk − Γr¯, (5)
where r¯ =
[
r>1 . . . r
>
N
]>
, Wii = Ini − γiPi, Wij =
−γiPij , and Γ = blkdiag(γ1In1 , . . . , γNInN ).
D. Subclasses of games within quadratic games
To both illustrate the breadth of quadratic games and
provide exemplars of the game graph concept, we describe
two important subclasses of games and their game graphs.
1) Finite horizon LQ game: Given initial state z0 ∈ Rm
and horizon T , each player i in an N -player, finite-horizon
LQ game selects an action sequence (u0i , . . . , u
T−1
i ) with u
t
i ∈
Rmi in order to minimize a cumulative state and control cost
subjected to state dynamics:
min
uti∈Rmi
1
2
(∑T
t=0(z
t)>Qizt +
∑T−1
t=0 (u
t
i)
>Riuti
)
s.t. zt+1 = Azt +
∑N
i=1Biu
t
i, t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
(6)
The LQ game defined by the collection of optimization
problems (6) for each i ∈ [N ] is equivalent to a one-
shot quadratic game in which each player selects Ui =
[(u0i )
>, . . . , (uT−1i )
>]> ∈ Rni with ni = Tmi, in order to
minimize their cost fi(U) defined by
1
2 (
∑N
j=1GjUj +Hz
0)>Q¯i(
∑N
j=1GjUj +Hz
0)+ 12U
>
i R¯iUi,
where U = (U1, . . . , UN ) is the joint action profile, and the
cost matrices are given by Q¯i = blkdiag{Qi, . . . , Qi},
Gi =

0 . . . 0
Bi . . . 0
...
. . .
...
AT−1Bi . . . Bi
, H =
 I...
AT
, (7)
and R¯i = blkdiag{Ri, . . . , Ri}. This follows precisely
from observing that the dynamics are equivalent to Z =∑N
i=1GiUi + Hz
0 where Z = [(z0)>, . . . , (zT )>]>. From
here, it is straight forward to rewrite the optimization problem
in (6) as minUi fi(U). The LQ game is a potential game if
and only if Qi = Qj and Ri = Rj for all i, j ∈ [N ].
LQ Game Graph. Suppose each player uses step size γi.
Since, Difi(U) is given by
(G>i Q¯iGi + R¯i)Ui +
∑
j 6=iG
>
i Q¯i(GjUj +Hz
0), (8)
the learning dynamics (5) are equivalent to
Uk+1 = WUk − Γ[Q¯1G1, . . . , Q¯NGN ]>Hz0, (9)
where W = In −M , with M ∈ Rn×n a blockwise matrix
having entries Mij = γiG>i Q¯iGj if i 6= j and Mij =
γi(G
>
i Q¯iGi + R¯i) otherwise.
2) Bilinear games: Bilinear games are an important class
of games. For instance, a number of game formulations in
adversarial learning have a hidden bilinear structure [17]. In
evaluating and selecting hyper-parameter configurations in so-
called test suites, pairwise comparisons between algorithms
are formulated as bimatrix games [18], [19].
Formally, a two player bilinear game1, a subclass of contin-
uous quadratic games, is defined by f1(x1, x2) = x>1 Ax2 and
f2(x1, x2) = x
>
1 B
>x2 where A ∈ Rn1×n2 and B ∈ Rn2×n1
and xi ∈ Rni . Common approaches to learning in games [17],
[20], simultaneous and alternating gradient descent both cor-
respond to a linear system.
Game graph for simultaneous gradient play. Players up-
date their strategies simultaneously by following the gradient
of their own cost with respect to their choice variable:
xk+11 = x
k
1 − γ1Axk2 , xk+12 = xk2 − γ2Bxk1 (10)
The simultaneous gradient play game graph is given by
Ws =
[
I −γ1A
−γ2B I
]
. (11)
Game graph for alternating gradient play. In zero-sum
bilinear games, it has been shown that alternating gradient play
has better convergence properties [20]. Alternating gradient
play is defined by
xk+11 = x
k
1 − γ1Axk2 , xk+12 = xk2 − γ2Bxk+11 (12)
Examining the second player’s update, we see that xk+12 =
(I + γ1γ2BA)x
k
2 − γ2Bxk1 . The game graph in this case is
defined by
Wa =
[
I −γ1A
−γ2B I + γ1γ2BA
]
. (13)
1The bilinear game formulation and corresponding game graph for different
gradient-based learning rules easily extend to an N -player setting, however
the results in Sec. IV are presented for two player games.
Remark 1. Convergence of (10) and boundedness of (12)
depend on choosing appropriate step sizes γ1 and γ2 [3], [20].
We consider disturbance decoupling for settings such as these
where the undisturbed dynamics are convergent.
IV. DISTURBANCE DECOUPLING ON GAME GRAPH
In this section, we derive the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion that ensures decoupling of gradient disturbance from the
learning trajectory of a subset of players. We emphasize that
the condition holds for disturbances with arbitrary magnitudes
and functions. This is a useful result because it provides
guarantees on both the equilibrium behavior and the learning
trajectory under adversarial disturbance.
Definition 3 (Complete disturbance decoupling). Given initial
joint action x0 ∈ Rn, game costs (f1, . . . , fN ), step sizes Γ ∈
Rn×n, suppose that player i’s gradient update is corrupted
as in (3), then for player j 6= i, action xj is decoupled from
the disturbance in player i’s gradient if the uncorrupted and
corrupted dynamics, given respectively by
xk+1 = Wxk − Γr¯, yk+1 = Wyk − Γr¯ − Γdk (14)
result in identical trajectories for player j when y0 = x0. That
is, ykj = x
k
j holds for all k ≥ 0, dk ∈ Di, where
Di = {d = [d1, . . . , dN ] ∈ Rn | dj = 0,∀ j 6= i}.
A. Algebraic condition
We first derive an algebraic condition on the joint action
space for disturbance decoupling. Define M⊥ = {x ∈
Rn | x>x˜ = 0, ∀ x˜ ∈ M} and let im(A) = {Ax | x ∈ Rn}
denote the image of A ∈ Rm×n.
Proposition 1. Consider an N -player quadratic game
(f1, . . . , fN ) as in Definition 2 under learning dynamics as
given by (2), where player i experiences gradient disturbance
as given by (3). Let S(i) = {x = [x1, . . . , xN ] ∈ Rn | xj =
0, ∀ j 6= i} be the joint action subset. For player j 6= i, the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) Player j is disturbance decoupled from player i.
(ii) W kv ∈ S(j)⊥, ∀ v ∈ S(i), ∀ 0 ≤ k < n.
(iii) im(W kE) ⊆ im(Y ), ∀ 0 ≤ k < n, where E ∈ Rn×ni
and Y ∈ Rn×(n−nj) are matrices such that im(E) =
S(i) and im(Y ) = S(j)⊥.
Proof. For a quadratic game (f1, . . . , fN ), the learning dy-
namics without and with disturbances reduce to the equations
in (14). Given initial joint action x0,
xk = W kx0 − [W k−1 . . . W 0]Γ [r¯> . . . , r¯>]> ,
yk = xk − [W k−1 . . . W 0]Γ [(d0)> . . . , (dk−1)>]>.
Then, Definition 3 is equivalent to
∑M−1
l=0 W
M−l−1dl ∈
S(j)⊥ satisfied for M ≥ 1 and dl ∈ S(i). Since the condition
holds for all M ≥ 1, it is equivalent to W kdl ∈ S(j)⊥ for all
k ≥ 0 and dl ∈ S(i). This is then equivalent to W kdl ∈ S(j)⊥
for all 0 ≤ k < n and dl ∈ S(i). To see this equivalence,
consider the following result from Cayley-Hamilton theorem,
W k =
∑n−1
l=0 αlW
l for some αl ∈ R. Thus, for k ≥ n and
any d ∈ S(i), W kd = ∑n−1l=0 W lαld = ∑n−1l=0 W ldˆl where
dˆl = αld ∈ S(i) for l = 0, . . . , n − 1, which implies that
W kd ∈ S(j)⊥. This concludes the equivalence.
Finally, we note that (iii) is a restatement of (ii). Further-
more, (iii) can be verified in polynomial time.
Remark 2. In connection to geometric control theory, con-
dition (iii) of Proposition 1 is equivalent the fact that
im([E, . . . ,Wn−1E]), the smallest W -invariant subspace
containing im(E), must be a subset of S(j)⊥ [12, Thm 4.6].
B. Graph-theoretic condition
Next we derive the graph-theoretic condition on the joint
action space for disturbance decoupling.
Theorem 1. Consider an N -player quadratic game
(f1, . . . , fN ) as in Definition 2 under learning dynamics as
given by (2), where player i experiences gradient disturbance
as given by (3). Player j 6= i is disturbance decoupled if and
only if the path weights of paths with length k satisfy∑
p∈Pkij
k−1∏
l=0
Wvl+1,vl = 0, ∀ 0 < k < n, (15)
where (vl, vl+1) denotes consecutive nodes on path p =
(i, v1, . . . , vk−1, j).
Proof. The result follows from equivalence between Proposi-
tion 1 condition (ii) and (15). Note that x ∈ S(i) is equivalent
to x` = 0 for all ` 6= i, and W kx ∈ S(j)⊥ is equivalent to
(W kx)j = 0 for all n > k ≥ 0. We prove the result by
induction. For k = 0, (W 0x)j = 0 ∀ x ∈ S(i) holds if
and only if i 6= j. For k > 0, (W kx)j = 0 ∀ x ∈ S(i)
is equivalent to i 6= j and (W k)ji = 0. Suppose that for
i, j ∈ [N ], (W k)ji is the sum of path weights over all
paths of length k, originating at i and ending at j, then
(W k+1)ji is the sum of path weights over all paths of length
k + 1, originating at i and ending at j. Let W k = M , then
(W k+1)ji =
∑
q∈[N ]MjqWqi, where MjqWqi 6= 0 if and only
if the sum of path weights of length k from q to j is nonzero
and there is an edge from i to q. Furthermore, MjqWqi is the
sum of path weights over all paths of length k+ 1 from i to j
each of which contains vk = q. Since we sum over q ∈ [N ],
we conclude that (W k+1)ji is the sum of all paths weights of
length k + 1 from i to j, i.e., (i, v1, . . . , vk, j) ∈ Pk+1ij .
The concept of disturbance decoupling is quite counter-
intuitive: any change in player i’s action does not affect player
j’s action, despite fj being implicitly dependent on xi through
the network of player cost functions. As we see from the proof
of Theorem 1, this situation arises when the dependencies
‘cancel’ each other out, i.e. the sum of path weights from
i to j is always zero for equally lengthed paths.
Example 1 (Disturbance decoupled players). Consider a
4 player quadratic game where xi ∈ R and the game
graph is given by Figure 1. Edge weights α, β, γ, and
δ ∈ R, while each self loop has weight wi > 0.
Paths of length k ≤ 4 from player 1 to player 4 are
enumerated as P114 = {∅}, P214 = {(1, 2, 4), (1, 3, 4)},
Fig. 1: A simple game graph between four players
and P314 = {(1, 1, 2, 4), (1, 1, 3, 4), (1, 2, 2, 4), (1, 3, 3, 4) ,
(1, 2, 4, 4), (1, 3, 4, 4)}. To satisfy Theorem 1, the sum of path
weights for each Pk14 must be 0 for 0 < k < 4. There are
no paths of length one, summation for k = 2 implies the
criteria αγ + βδ = 0, and summation for k = 3 implies
the criteria (w1 + w2 + w4)αγ + (w1 + w3 + w4)βδ = 0.
If w2 = w3, αγ + βδ = 0 is necessary and sufficient for
disturbance decoupling between player 1 and player 4.
Remark 3. Disturbance decoupling is a structural property of
the game in terms of disturbance propagation and attenuation.
An open research problem is linking this structural property to
robust decision making under uncertainties in cost parameters
Pi, Pij and step sizes γi.
The following corollary specializes to the class of potential
games [15], which arise in many applications [21]–[23].
Corollary 1. Consider an N -player quadratic potential game
under learning dynamics as given by (2), where player i
experiences gradient disturbance as given by (3). Player i is
disturbance decoupled from player j 6= i if and only if player
j is also disturbance decoupled from player i.
Proof. In a potential game graph, Wij = W>ji . Therefore, a
path p with path weight Wj,vk−1 . . .Wv1,i exists from i to j
if and only if a path p′ with path weight Wi,v1 , . . . ,Wvk−1,j
exists from j to i. Therefore, (15) holds from player i to player
j if and only if it holds from player j to player i.
Corollary 2. Consider an N -player finite horizon LQ game
as in (6) under learning dynamics as given by (9), where
player i experiences gradient disturbance as given by (3), if
disturbance decoupling holds between player j and gradient
disturbance from player i, then B
>
j
...
B>j (A
>)T−1
Qj [Bi · · · AT−1Bi] = 0. (16)
If Qj is positive definite and T ≥m, the controllable subspace
of (A˜, B˜i) must lie in the unobservable subspace of (B˜>j , A˜
>)
where A˜ = Q1/2j AQ
−1/2
j , B˜i = Q
1/2
j Bi, and B˜j = Q
1/2
j Bj .
Proof. For player j to be disturbance decoupled from player
i, edge (i, j) cannot exist, i.e. −γjG>j Q¯jGi = 0 from (7).
Expanding G>j Q¯jGi = M ∈ Rnj×ni , Mpq ∈ Rmj×mi
is given by
∑T−1
t=min{p,q}B
>
j (A
>)t−pQjAt−qBi. We unwrap
these conditions starting from p = T − 1, q = T − 1; in this
case Mpq = B>j QjBi = 0 is necessary. Then we consider
MT−2,T−2 = B>j A
>QjABi + B>j QjBi = 0, which implies
that B>j A
>QjABi is necessary. Subsequently, this implies
that all B>j (A
>)tQjAtBi = 0 is necessary for t ∈ [0, T ).
Similarly, we note that MT−1,q = B>j QjA
qBi = 0 and
Mp,T−1 = B>j (A
>)pQjBi = 0. From these we can use the
rest of M to conclude that B>j (A
>)pQjAqBi = 0 for any
p, q ∈ [0, T ). This condition is equivalent to (16).
We apply Theorem 1 to two player bilinear games and prove
a necessary condition for disturbance decoupling between
different coordinates of each player’s action space that is
independent of players’ step sizes.
Corollary 3. Consider a two player bilinear game under
learning dynamics (10) and (12), where coordinates x1,i and
x2,i experience gradient disturbance as given by (3). If j 6= i
and coordinate x1,j is disturbance decoupled from coordinate
x1,i, (A,B) must satisfy
∑n2
`=1 b`iaj` = 0, where apq and bpq
denote the (p, q)th elements of A and B, respectively. Simi-
larly, if j 6= i and coordinate x2,j is disturbance decoupled
from coordinate x2,i, (A,B) must satisfy
∑n1
`=1 bj`a`i = 0.
Proof. We construct games played by n1 + n2 players with
actions {x1,1, . . . , x1,n1 , x2,1, . . . , x2,n2} and whose game
graphs are identical to Ws (11) and Wa (13). First consider
disturbance decoupling of x1,j from x1,i. In both learning
dynamics, {x1,1, . . . , x1,n1} do not have any edges between
players. Therefore, paths between x1,i and x1,j with length 2
is given by P = {(x1,i, x2,`, x1,j) | ` ∈ [n2]}. We sum path
weights over P to obtain ∑n2`=1 b`iaj` = 0 for disturbance
decoupling of x1,j from x1,i in (10) and (12). A similar
argument follows for disturbance decoupling of x2,j from x2,i
in (10). For disturbance decoupling of x2,j from x2,i in (12),
we note that a edge from x2,i to x2,j exists with weight
γ1γ2(BA)ji when j 6= i. Disturbance decoupling requires
γ1γ2(BA)ji = 0, therefore
∑n1
`=1 bj`a`i=0.
Corollary 4. Consider a two player bilinear game under
learning dynamics (10) and (12), where coordinates x1,i
and x2,i experience gradient disturbance as given by (3). If
coordinate x2,j is disturbance decoupled from coordinate x1,i,
(A,B) must satisfy bji = 0 and
∑n2
q=1 bqi
∑n1
`=1 a`qbj` = 0,
where apq and bpq denote the (p, q)th elements of A and
B, respectively. If coordinate x1,j is disturbance decoupled
from coordinate x2,i, (A,B) must satisfy aji = 0 and∑n1
q=1 aqi
∑n2
`=1 b`qaj`=0.
Proof. We construct games played by n1 + n2 players with
actions {x1,1, . . . , x1,n1 , x2,1, . . . , x2,n2} and whose game
graphs are identical to Ws (11) and Wa (13). In both learning
dynamics, disturbance decoupling requires no direct path
between the decoupled players. Therefore aji = 0 or bji = 0.
Consider disturbance decoupling of x1,j from x2,i in (10),
paths of length 3 from x2,i to x1,j without self loops is given
by P = {(x2,i, x1,q, x2,`, x1,j) | q ∈ [n1], ` ∈ [n2]}. A path of
length 3 with self loops must also include (x2,i, x1,j), whose
weight is 0. We sum path weights over p ∈ P to obtain∑n1
q=1 aqi
∑n2
`=1 b`qaj` = 0. A similar argument is made for
disturbance decoupling of x2,j from x1,i in (10).
Consider disturbance decoupling of x2,j from x1,i in (12),
paths of length 2 from x1,i to x2,j without self loops is
given by Q = {(x1,i, x2,q, x2,j) | q ∈ [n2]}. A path of
length 2 with self loops must also include (x1,i, x2,j), whose
weight is 0. Weight of (x2,q, x2,j) is given by γ1γ2(BA)jq
= γ1γ2
∑n1
`=1 bj`a`q . We sum path weights over p ∈ Q to
obtain
∑n2
q=1 bqi
∑n1
`=1 a`qbj` = 0. A similar argument is made
for disturbance decoupling of x1,j from x2,i in (12).
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We provide an example of disturbance decoupling in a LQ
game. Consider a tug-of-war game in which a single target
z ∈ R2 is controlled by four players. We assume that player
i can move z along vector Bi ∈ R2 by ui ∈ R, and that z is
stationary without any player input, i.e., A = I . Starting with a
randomized initial condition z0, at each step t, the target moves
according to the dynamics zt+1 = zt +
∑4
i=1Biu
t
i where
B1 = [1, 0]
>, B2 = [ 1√2 ,
1√
2
]>, B3 = [−1√2 ,
1√
2
]>, B4 =
[0, 1]>. Each player i’s cost function is given by
1
2
∥∥z9 − ci∥∥22 +∑8t=0 12 ‖zt − ci‖22 + 10 ‖uti‖22
which describes player i’s objective to move target z towards
ci ∈ R2 in a finite time T = 10 by using minimal amount of
control. By designing the game dynamics to satisfy Theorem 1,
we ensure that player 4’s action is disturbance decoupled from
player 1’s.
Using the equivalent formulation as described in
Section III-D1, Difi(U) = (G>i Q¯iGi + R¯i)Ui +∑
j 6=iG
>
i Q¯i(GjUj + Hz
0 − Ci) where Ci = [c>i , . . . , c>i ]>.
Hence, the learning dynamics are Uk+1 = WUk +
ΓQ¯i[G1, . . . , GN ]
>[(Hz0 − C1)>, . . . , (Hz0 − CN )>]>,
where Wij = G>i Q¯iGj = E ⊗ B>i Bj with B>1 B2 = B>1 B3
= B>2 B4 =
1√
2
, B>2 B3 = B
>
1 B4 = 0, B
>
3 B4 = − 1√2 ,
B>1 B1 = B
>
2 B2 = B
>
3 B3 = B
>
4 B4 = 1, and
E =

9 8 7 . . . 1
8 8 7 . . . 1
7 7 7
. . . 1
...
. . . 1
1 . . . 1
 ∈ R
9×9.
To ensure convergence of the undisturbed learning dy-
namics [3], we use uniform step sizes such that Γ =
blkdiag(γ1I, . . . , γ4I) with γi =
√
α
β , where α =
λmin
(
1
4 (W+W
>)>(W+W>)
)
and β = λmax
(
W>W
)
with
λmax(·) and λmin(·) denoting the maximum and minimum
eigenvalues of their arguments, respectively. The associated
game graph is given in Figure 1, where α = β = γ = 1√
2
E
and δ = − 1√
2
E. A path p = (1, v1, . . . , vk−1, 4) of length k
must have path weight (−1√
2
)mδ( 1√
2
)mγEk, where mδ (mγ)
denotes the number of times the edge with weight δ (γ) is
traversed in p.
Disturbance decoupling between players 1 and 4 is guar-
anteed if all paths of length k ∈ (0, 36) satisfy (15). We can
numerically verify that Proposition 1 is satisfied or make the
following graph-theoretic observations based on Theorem 1.
First, due to the symmetry within the game graph, the ex-
istence of path p = (1, v1, . . . , vk−1, 4) with path weight
Fig. 2: Left: Trajectory of z with and without disturbances.
Players’ preferred destinations are given by triangles. Top
right: Players’ game costs during learning. Bottom right:
Players’ control error as a function of disturbance magnitude.
L = (−1√
2
)mδ( 1√
2
)mγEk implies the existence of path pˆ =
(1, vˆ1, . . . , vˆk−1, 4) with path weight Lˆ = (−1√2 )
mˆδ( 1√
2
)mˆγEk,
where mγ = mˆδ and mδ = mˆγ . Second, since edges (3, 4)
and (2, 4) form a cut between player 1 and player 4 in the
game graph, any path between them has the property that
mγ + mδ is odd. From these observations, we can conclude
that L = −Lˆ. Since each path p of length k and weight L
can be paired with path pˆ of equivalent length k and weight
Lˆ = −L, we conclude that all path sets Pk14 where k > 0
must satisfy Theorem 1.
To numerically verify disturbance decoupling, we simulate
the uncorrupted learning trajectory of z, shown in the left plot
of Figure 2 in purple. We then inject a random disturbance
into player 1’s gradient updates as given by (3) with increasing
magnitude, and observe its effects on each player’s action. A
sample corrupted trajectory is shown in the left plot of Figure 2
in brown. In the bottom right plot of Figure 2, we show the
total error in each player’s action from to the uncorrupted
optimal action. We observe that player 4 does not deviate
from the optimal action, while player 1’s action error increases
as the disturbance magnitude increases. We note that these
results hold despite the fact that gradient-based learning no
longer converges. In the top right plot of Figure 2, individual
player costs are compared in one round of gradient-based
learning where ‖di‖ ≤ 50 is injected. Interestingly, despite
action remaining uncorrupted, player 4’s cost is disturbance
affected. Note that the disturbance decoupling in actions does
not necessarily imply disturbance decoupling in costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated and characterized the effects of
gradient disturbances on an N–player gradient-based learning
dynamics. For quadratic games, we defined disturbance de-
coupling for arbitrary disturbances, and showed the cost cou-
pling structure is crucial in facilitating decoupling individual
player’s action from input disturbance. Our future work aims to
leverage these analysis results to design incentives for players
to ensure disturbance decoupling.
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